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Abstract 
Academics are increasingly encouraged to acquire external grants to finance their research, and often 
hold grants from multiple funders concurrently to ensure the continuity of their work. However, there 
are concerns that inefficiencies occur when funding is received from multiple sponsors, especially 
when this originates from different sectors. This study investigates complementarities between 
public/non-profit and private sector sources of research funding with regard to academic output in 
terms of publications, research impact and research orientation. The empirical analysis is based on 
novel data on external public/non-profit research grants and industry funding for tenured engineering 
academics employed at fifteen UK universities. The results suggest that while research grants are 
generally associated with higher research outcomes, industry funding decreases the marginal utility of 
public/non-profit funding by lowering the increase in publication rate associated with public/non-
profit grants. At the same time, for more commercially oriented research, measured as its patentability 
score, we find some support for complementarities between public and private-sector research funding. 
These results suggest that provision of public grants is crucial to the production of research that is 
distributed openly through publications and proceedings. Private sector grants are important as they 
may enable more applied research trajectories for those capable of combining publicly and industry 
sponsored research. 
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1 Introduction 
Across Europe, where universities were traditionally financed through block grants, governments have 
introduced or increased the amount of funding distributed through grant funding schemes (Stephan, 
2012). Grant-based funding has been seen as a mechanism to reward and thus provide incentives for 
the most able researchers. Stagnating public research budgets further meant that researchers are 
increasingly encouraged to seek funding elsewhere, e.g. to source funding from industry and other 
sponsors. Such external research income allows researchers to secure funding for equipment and 
research assistance, potentially leading to more autonomy and flexibility. It is thus usually 
accompanied by an increase in research productivity, regardless of the sponsor (Stephan, 2012), and 
researchers that receive some external funding outperform those who do not acquire external grants 
(Kelchtermans and Veugelers, 2011). 
These developments not only encourage academics to look for grants elsewhere but also mean that 
many hold multiple grants concurrently. Wang et al. (2012), for example, analyse named sponsors on 
academic publications in 10 selected countries. They show for the case of the UK that 43% of 
academic publications acknowledge external funding and report an average of 2.8 funding agents per 
paper. They also observe that the UK funding system is particularly diversified, with no one funding 
agent dominating. Nevertheless, despite being commonplace, few papers have analysed the 
concurrence of different types of funding and their effect on research impact. Some studies argue that 
multiple grants may result in more impactful research due to more vigorous peer-review or the 
additional means to support research (Lewison and Dawson, 1998). However, there are also concerns 
that inefficiencies occur when funding is received from multiple sponsors, for example when it is used 
to double-fund research (Garner et al., 2013) or due to additional administrative requirements. In 
addition, tensions could arise as multiple sponsors’ goals may not always be aligned, especially with 
regard to the open dissemination of research results, which could result in fewer research outputs.  
Prior literature has voiced concerns with regard to funding from industry, which has been identified as 
an important source of research income by both universities and by policy makers. While researchers 
may be able to benefit in their academic work from closer links with industry via insights into applied 
processes and problems in industry that may provide the ideas for new ground-breaking research 
(Rosenberg, 1998), their publication quantity and quality may decrease if industry partners limit 
research freedom by determining research topics and demanding secrecy (Cohen et al., 1998). The 
question of the relationship between public and private research funding is therefore particularly 
critical given the need of researchers to seek research funding and the potentially negative effects of 
industry involvement on some research outcomes (Banal-Estanol et al., 2015; Hottenrott and 
Thorwarth, 2011; Rentocchini et al., 2014; Toole and Czarnitzki, 2010).  
We use data on the research incomes of 807 individual academics at 15 UK universities over a seven 
year period to investigate the individual and joint effects of public and private funding on the 
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publication and patenting performance of the sponsored academics.1 Previous studies have shown a 
positive effect of external funding on publication output, but that larger shares of research funding 
coming from industry are associated with a decreased publication rate and increased patent rate 
(Manjarres-Henriquez et al., 2008; Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011; Lawson, 2013a; Banal-Estanol et 
al., 2015). These studies, however, have not addressed the question of whether these relationships are 
indicative of complementarities or substitution between different types of funding. Our results add to 
these insights by showing firstly that external research grants are generally associated with higher 
research output in terms of the number of publications regardless of source. The paper further shows 
that research quality measured in terms of basic science publications, citations or average impact 
factor increases only with public funding but not with industry funding. However, industry funding 
decreases the marginal utility of public funding by decreasing the publication rate increase associated 
with public grants for publication and proceeding counts as well as for research quality for most of the 
industry funding distribution. These results are robust to controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and 
to accounting for the non-randomness of funding allocation. For more applied research outcomes, as 
measured by the patentability score of an academic’s research, the influence of both types of research 
funding is only positive if they occur simultaneously, providing some evidence for complementarity of 
public and private-sector research funding. Using industry co-authored publications and patents 
instead as measures for applied research outcomes, however, shows a positive, but independent effect 
of both types of funding for most of the industry funding distribution, thus implying additivity. These 
findings suggest that there are few complementarities in terms of quantity and quality of research 
outcomes to be realised from concurrent funding and that time constraints and administrative burdens 
may outweigh possible performance increases. The result that the patentability of research only 
increases when both types of funding are present, suggests that funding from diverse sources is 
conductive to more applied research agendas.  
                                                          
1
 The UK has a dual funding structure where public funding for research is provided through two 
routes: institutional ‘core’ grants and competitive research council grants. While during the first half 
of the 2000s research council grants accounted for just 12% of public funding, this was 22% in 2013 
(Source: Higher Education Statistical Agency (HESA), own calculation). The amount of ‘core’ 
funding and research council provision has moreover decreased in real terms since 2009. These 
developments have also increased the importance of research grants and contracts from other sources 
over the past 20 years. During our sample period (2001-2007) industry funding accounted for 10% of 
total research (non-‘core’) grants and contracts and for 17%-21% of research grant income in 
engineering sciences. The HESA data also shows that industry funding is pro-cyclical. It declined after 
the crisis year 2008 but is increasing again since 2012. 
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2 Research funding and research productivity 
2.1 Industry grants and research outcomes 
Industry grants have been identified as a major source of funding for academic research in recent years. 
In the US the so called competitiveness crisis prompted a series of structural changes in the intellectual 
property regime accompanied by several incentive programmes designed specifically to promote 
collaboration between universities and industry (Lee, 2000). Similar incentive schemes were 
implemented in Europe and elsewhere (Geuna and Nesta, 2006). In many subject areas, including 
engineering and material science, much of the research would not be possible without the input of 
industry partners. In a survey of 671 academic scientists and engineers, Lee (2000) reports securing of 
funds for equipment and research assistants as the principal reason for collaboration with industry. 
Further, Slaughter and Rhoades (2004) argue that university researchers may be motivated to interact 
with private companies for reasons other than access to additional research funding, for example 
finding potential co-authors and ideas for their research agenda. Mansfield (1995) reported that a 
substantial number of university research projects were initiated through consulting activities with 
firms and also Lee (2000) identified the acquisition of research ideas as one of the main motives for 
researchers to pursue joint research with industry.  
However, more than just providing an attractive source of additional research funding to supplement 
the department’s core resources, external sponsorship involves contractual agreements and research 
guidance that could potentially affect academic research. Specifically, the objectives of different 
sponsors may influence the choice of research topics and the choice of dissemination channels 
(Slaughter and Leslie, 1997; Cohen et al., 1998; Benner and Sandström, 2000), and industry sponsors 
may have a particular interest in influencing research and dissemination channels to recover their 
investments. Accordingly, it has been claimed that industry partners could direct academics towards 
more applied research and limit or delay the public dissemination of research results (Blumenthal et al., 
1996; Cohen et al., 1998). Blumenthal et al. (2006) and Czarnitzki et al. (2015a) find evidence for 
such publication delay and secrecy associated with industry funding. They conclude that academics' 
research activities may be compromised by an increase in industry-sponsorship and commercialisation 
of research.  
Empirical evidence on the topic is mixed and partially dependent on the type of activity undertaken 
with industry. Manjarres-Henriquez et al. (2009) and Banal-Estanol et al. (2015) show a curvilinear 
effect of the share of industry research funding on publication output which may be indicative of a 
complementary effect of public and private funding up to a certain threshold. Other studies find a 
positive link between the share of research income from industry and the extent of patenting 
(Hottenrott and Thorwarth, 2011; Lawson, 2013a). Lawson (2013a), in the case of the UK, finds a 
positive effect of industry sponsorship regardless of whether patents are owned by universities or 
private firms which may indicate that industry links encourage commercially oriented research in 
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academics in general. Other recent studies instead report negative correlations when looking at the 
effect of income from consulting activities or start-up foundation on publications (Manjarres-
Henriquez et al., 2008, Rentocchini et al., 2014 and Toole and Czarnitzki, 2010). Hottenrott and 
Lawson (2014), finally, analysing a sample of German professors in science and engineering find that 
those who report industry as a source for research ideas publish and patent less than their peers who 
source research ideas from elsewhere. Their findings suggest that ideas coming from industry do not 
translate into more or better quality publications and patents.  
These mixed results indicate a need for more systematic analysis of potential complementarities 
between different types of funding. On the one hand, concurrent funding may open up opportunities 
for research, recombination of ideas stemming from different projects and consequently the research 
outputs associated with the research, resulting in complementarities between different funding sources. 
On the other hand, the combined receipt of public and private research funding could lead to tensions 
which affect the overall returns to research funding negatively. These tensions and complementarities 
between different types of funding may, however, likely differ depending on the type of research 
output that is pursued.  
2.2 Basic versus applied science 
It seems reasonable to assume that different types of grants are not frictionless adjustable as they are 
subject to different application and administration costs and are accompanied by different sponsor 
expectations. If academics receive industry grants in addition to their public grants, their publication 
output could be reduced due to several reasons. Contractual arrangements with the sponsor may 
require delaying or withholding results from publication in scientific journals (Blumenthal et al., 1996; 
Cohen et al., 1998; Czarnitzki et al. 2015a). Earlier research has also found that funding from industry 
is less targeted at the production of scientific publications and basic research than unrestricted funding 
from public sponsors (Blumenthal et al., 1996). Funding from industry could thus adversely affect an 
academic’s publication behaviour especially with regard to publications in scientific journals and for 
more basic research projects (Cohen et al., 1998). Moreover, academics may encounter conflicting 
incentives and guidelines in their research when receiving funding from more than one agent. Public 
funding aimed at free dissemination may be contradicted with industry funding which favours the 
appropriation of knowledge. The direct involvement of industry sponsors in the research process as 
well as the supervision of contract research and the exchange of results may limit the disclosure of 
research results or lead to publications that are of lower quality. Moreover, industry-sponsored 
projects can be related to, but still substantially different from, an academic’s other research projects in 
terms of materials used, methodologies applied or procedures necessary to obtain usable results. Thus, 
when more time is allocated to industry-sponsored research and development, traditional research 
could be compromised. In particular, more basic research lines will not be pursued (Slaughter and 
Leslie, 1997; Benner and Sandström, 2000).  
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The nature of the sponsor (public vs. private) may therefore proxy for research content that is chosen 
by the academic vs. research content that is at least partially led by the funder. Although some industry 
funders may provide funding for blue sky research and some public sponsors may instead ask for 
tender, previous literature suggests that research that is no longer exclusively led by academics is more 
likely to happen when the sponsor is from industry (Perkmann and Walsh, 2009). Joint funding could 
then result in a substitution between different grants and a negative effect of industry funding on the 
marginal benefits associated with public grants in terms of publications. These effects are likely to be 
particularly strong for the quality and academic impact of research. 
On the other hand, industry sponsorship is also likely to increase the marginal benefits associated with 
public grants, through the provision of additional funding and contact with real-world problems. If 
researchers obtain new ideas through links with industry then the expected benefits from public 
funding placed with these researchers should also increase because of positive complementarities 
(Mansfield, 1995; Zucker and Darby, 1996; Zucker et al., 1998). This may be particularly visible in 
shifts towards research that is more applied and commercially-oriented due to a pull or learning effects 
from industry. Previous empirical work has also shown that, especially in the field of engineering, 
publications and patents are complementary (Agrawal and Henderson, 2002) and funding could thus 
benefit both. Academics receiving industry support in addition to public funding may be more likely to 
recognise and realise the commercial potential of their research. Nevertheless, more applied research 
may be more likely to be affected by secrecy concerns on the side of the industry sponsor. Banal-
Estanol et al. (2015), for example, find publication trade-offs associated with industry collaboration 
only in the case of applied research publications, but not for more basic research lines. Still, academics 
receiving industry support in addition to public funding will be more likely to recognise and realise the 
commercial potential of their research and we expect complementarities in industry and public grants 
with regard to the patentability of research. 
3 Empirical model 
We base our empirical model of the effects of research funding on research outcomes on the notion 
that an academic exerts research efforts aimed at producing measurable outputs. External resources are 
crucial for scientific production (Stephan, 1996, 2012) and the number and quality of outcomes is 
expected to be at least non-decreasing with funding received from external sponsors (Kelchtermans 
and Veugelers, 2011). We consider funding from at least two types of funding agents as inputs to the 
research output function.2 
                                                          
2
 We distinguish public/non-profit from private sector funding. Public/non-profit funding may stem 
from UK research councils (mainly EPSRC), UK charities, UK government, the EU and other public 
overseas sponsors. See section 4.2 for details on the funding information. 
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The research output function in its most general form is then given by: 
() = 	
, 
, |	,      (1) 
Where Pit are research outputs and their measures for their quality or research orientation (basic or 
commercially oriented research), 
 and 
denote two different types of funding allocated in t-
1, where one could be considered public/non-profit, peer-reviewed funding, and the other funding 
from industry. We use funding split across the award period and lagged by one year to capture the 
impact of financial resource on scientific productivity in t.3 Xit are other explanatory factors such as 
age, rank or gender. We then include the notion of a positive increase from either type of funding with 
potential substitution or complementarity effects: 
() =  
+
 + 

 +  +     (2) 
where φ is the vector of parameters to be estimated and ε is the error term given as εit=uit+ vi+τt, where 
vi is the unobserved individual effect, and τt is the time fixed effect. To estimate the existence and 
extent of any complementary or substitution effect between different types of funding we interact the 
two funding variables and estimate their joint effect. In addition, while research outputs are assumed 
to benefit from research grant input, this does not rule out diminishing returns as shown in Manjarres-
Henriquez et al. (2009) and Banal-Estanol et al. (2015) and these should therefore be considered when 
estimating funding effects. . 
The analysis takes two different approaches, a dynamic feedback model estimated via Poisson and 
GLS regressions and dose-response functions based on the Generalized Propensity Score (GPS) 
approach. The GPS for continuous treatments is an extension of the more commonly applied 
propensity score methods for binary treatments (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, 1984) and multi-valued 
treatments (Imbens, 2000; Lechner, 2001) which takes into account the selectivity in the grants 
awarding processes (Bia and Mattei, 2008; Guardabascio and Ventura. 2013). Both approaches are 
discussed in Section 5. 
4 Data and descriptive analysis 
4.1 Data 
The following analysis tests for direct and joint effects of different types of research funding on 
several measures for research output. The analysis is based on a novel data set of tenured engineering 
                                                          
3
 The exact lag between funding and publication will depend on the individual project. A look at a 
random sample of research council grants awarded in 2006 in engineering (Source: “Gateway to 
Research”, the UK online research council funding database) showed that about half reported their 
first publication in 2007 already. A one year time lag is therefore adopted here. 
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academics employed at 15 UK universities containing information on external public research grants 
and industry funding, journal publications, citations to these publications, conference proceedings and 
patents.  
The original database was built using yearly staff registers in academic calendars and on academic 
websites of 40 UK universities for the 1986 to 2007 period.4 All academics working as lecturers, 
senior lecturers, readers or professors at engineering departments were identified, their career 
progression recorded and their names manually matched to their publication and patent records (see 
Banal-Estanol et al. 2015 for a detailed description of the database). 
To gain access to funding information for academics, we contacted all the engineering departments by 
email. Fifteen departments5 provided us with detailed records containing information on private and 
public research grants received by their departmental staff during the period 2001 to 20076 (see Table 
A1 in the Appendix for a list of universities). Information on consultancy contracts was not solicited. 
We manually matched this information to the 885 academics that worked at one of the 15 universities 
for a minimum of six years during the 2001-2007 period.  
To acquire full publication and patent records for the period 1998 to 2007 (the sample period plus a 
three year pre-sample time-window), we further complemented the original database with publications 
and patents for the years that were not covered by the original database. This includes years spent 
outside the sampled engineering departments, PhD or postdoctoral periods, or, in the case of patents, 
filings made after 2005 as these were not included in the original sample. We further collected data on 
published conference proceedings. Journal and conference publications were obtained from the ISI 
Web of Science (WoS) database. Patent application data was obtained from esp@cenet (the European 
Patent Office (EPO) web-interface), which allows searches for patent applications filed with the EPO, 
                                                          
4
 The sampling involved firstly the identification of the 89 universities offering engineering courses 
based on the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). All 39 pre-1992 institutions were explicitly 
excluded at the time of data collection. For 10 additional institutions no staff data could be collected. 
The 40 sampled universities receive the bulk of research funding in engineering (>80% from all 
sources [Source: 2008 RAE]), and thus represent the most research active engineering departments.  
5
 The 15 universities do not differ significantly from the original sample of 40 in terms of the number 
of publications and patents by individual academic staff, but staff receive a slightly higher amount of 
research council funding (KS-test: p=0.040).  
6
 The period 2001 to 2007 is the preferred period for this analysis as it covers a larger number of 
universities and represents the assessment period for the 2008 RAE. The research information can 
therefore be expected to be fairly standardised across the 15 institutions and adjusted to the 
requirements of the RAE. It is therefore considered most reliable and comparable across institutions. 
8 
 
the UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO), the US patent office (USPTO) and other national patent 
offices. We downloaded all WoS and espacenet entries with the same last name and first initial before 
proceeding to clean all database entries manually to assure correct matching to individual academics. 
In the case of patents we considered all patent applications that named the focal academic as an 
inventor regardless of whether they were filed by the universities or third parties, e.g. industry or 
government agencies.7 Further, as each invention can lead to multiple patent applications (e.g. at 
different patent offices), we additionally verified each entry with the International Patent 
Documentation Center (INPADOC) that contains information grouped around a patent family, 
enabling us to uniquely identify the original invention and avoid multiple counts. In the remainder of 
the paper the term patent will refer to patent families grouped around an original priority patent (as 
defined in INPADOC) and not to individual patents or patent applications. The term will also be used 
regardless of whether the patent was granted or not. We recorded the filing date of the original priority 
patent as this represents the closest date to invention and collected all patents filed between 1998 and 
2007. 
We supplemented this data with PhD year and subject information. PhD information was taken from 
Index to Theses, an online database which lists theses accepted for higher degrees by the universities 
of the UK and Ireland. It provides information on PhD institution, year and subject area. For 
academics not listed in the database we searched their websites and gathered PhD details from the 
library catalogues of the PhD awarding university.8  We further collected department information 
regarding staff and student numbers from HESA. Data was available from 2003 onwards and 2003 
values were applied to earlier years.  
After exclusion of incomplete records, the final data set contains 807 engineering academics. Of these 
individuals, 58% received some external funding at least once during the six-year observation period.  
4.2 Variables and descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the sample are reported in Table 1. The main variables can be categorised 
as research output indicators, research funding as well as individual, departmental and institutional 
controls. Correlations between the funding and output indicators are reported in Table A2.  
Research Outputs 
                                                          
7
 Lawson (2013b) showed that in UK engineering more than 50% of academic inventions are not 
owned by the university but by private firms, government or individuals. 
8
 This concerned some PhDs awarded in the UK that were not submitted to Index to Theses as well as 
PhDs awarded outside the UK and Ireland. 
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Our main outcome measure is the annual count of publications (PUBLICATIONSit) for each academic 
i. The mean number of publications during the observation period is 2.26 per academic per year. 
Further, 8% of the academics in our sample did not publish during the entire six year period and 30% 
published less than one journal article per year.  
To measure the quality or ‘basicness’ of research we use two approaches. First, we measure the 
average number of citations received in the first five years after publication (AV.CITATIONSit), which 
represents an established measure for research quality. By applying a fixed citation time window we 
further ensure that all publications had the same time to accumulate citations. The average number of 
citations in the sample is 2.88. As a second approach we use the number of publications in basic 
science journals as a measure for more fundamental, science driven research. The measure is based the 
journal classification by Narin et al. (1976) that classified basic and applied type journals based on 
cross-citation matrices between journals.9 The authors distinguish between four categories where 1 is 
the most applied and 4 the most basic. We consider a publication to be science-oriented or basic if it 
falls in categories 3 or 4 (BASICit). The mean number of publications in such journals is 0.64.  
To measure the commercial applicability of each academic’s research, we follow Azoulay et al. (2009) 
and construct a patentability variable (PATENTABILITYit) that uses title words in publications to 
identify the focal academic’s research field and applies weights based on the extent to which these title 
words have appeared on publications that can be linked to patents. Specifically, we use patent-
publication-pairs (Murry, 2002) of UK engineering academics as a benchmark for patentable research 
and then compare the title words used by each academic to this benchmark. The procedure is described 
in detail in Annex B.  
In addition we construct a series of outcome variables that can serve as robustness checks in the 
analysis of funding complementarities. We use the number of proceedings as an alternative outcome 
count measure to publications (PROCEEDINGSit). Conference papers represent a more immediate 
outcome of research, providing access to recent discoveries (Lisee et al., 2008) and are considered as 
very important in several areas of engineering. As an alternative quality measure we make use of the 
journal impact factor (JIF), a measure of impact that is based on the average number of citations 
received by a journal’s articles in a specific year, in the first three years. Though not a direct measure 
of quality, the JIF represents the importance attributed to a particular journal. We calculate the average 
impact of academic i’s publications (AV.IMPACTit) by weighting each article by the corresponding 
journal’s JIF in t and dividing by the number of publications. As robustness check for commercially 
oriented research we use two measures. The first is the share of publications with at least one author-
                                                          
9  Here we use the 2005 classification updated by Kimberley Hamilton for the National Science 
Foundation (NSF). 
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address in industry (INDPUBit) as suggested by Azoulay et al. (2009). The second is the most direct 
measure of commercialisation, namely, whether the academic filed a patent in t (PATENTit). Results 
using these measures are presented and discussed in Appendix C. 
     [Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Research Funding 
The research income information includes the name of the principal investigator as well as data on 
funding source, award date, grant period and funding amount. We can attribute grant-based income to: 
(1) industry and business, (2) public/non-profit funding agents, including UK research councils 
(mainly EPSRC), UK charities, UK government, the EU and other public overseas sponsors.10 These 
represent all funding agents available to UK academics. The amount of funding is significantly higher 
for public grants with an average of more than £150,000 per grant and only £60,000 for industry 
grants. All funding amounts were split across the award period to avoid focussing the entire amount at 
the start of the grant and to account for the length of the research project. In other words, if the grant 
lasted two years we split it equally across those two years, if it lasted over three or more years, the first 
and the last years (which are assumed to not represent full calendar years) received half the share of an 
intermediate year. This was done in order to account for the on-going benefits and implications of a 
project.  
After excluding some outliers11 academics receive on average £32,000 per year in external funding. 
Industry funding amounts to approximately £6,000 per academic per year, while public funding 
provides approximately £26,000, with the majority being sourced from UK research councils and 
charities (circa £20,000). If we only consider academics that receive some funding during the 
observation period, the average amount of external funding per year is £55,400 with approximately 
                                                          
10
 Funding from charities is included in public/non-profit funding as selection mechanisms mirror 
those employed by research councils. Selection is based on peer-review and sponsorship is provided 
for blue-sky research, making these very prolific grants. Sponsors include Wellcome Trust or 
Leverhulme Trust. UK government sponsorship may be considered contract research, however, a 
robustness check omitting government funding from the public funding measure showed that results 
remain robust (results available from the authors upon request). 
11
 Outliers were identified using average values of leverage and (normalised) residuals following a 
linear regression of funding on publication outputs and are excluded using DFFITS (Belsley et al., 
1980) which measures the change in the predicted value when the ith observation is deleted. We follow 
Bollen and Jackman (1990) and exclude observations with DFFITS>1, meaning that the observation 
shifts the estimate by one standard deviation. We repeat the process for all funding variables and in 
total exclude 14 observations, most of which are EU funding outliers. 
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£9,800 coming from industry and £45,600 from public sponsors. The majority of academics receive 
funding from more than one type of funding agent during the observation period; 43% of academics, 
however, receive no external funding at all. Of those that receive external funding at least once, 60% 
are sponsored by industry (35% of the total sample). In terms of funding volume, UK research council 
and charity funding accounts for 65% of all external research income, funding from industry accounts 
for 17%, followed by EU with 11% and UK government with 8%.  
Looking at funding received during one period, we find that 42% of funded academics receive public 
and industry funding simultaneously at least once. Appendix Table A2 reports the correlation between 
different types of funding and the outcome measures. We find a strong positive correlation between 
public and industry funding. All publication count and quality measures correlate stronger with public 
funding, but the patentability measure has very weak correlations with both types of funding and 
industry co-authorship and patents are stronger correlated with industry funding than public funding.. 
Control variables 
We control for a series of individual and institutional attributes of the academics that may affect 
research outcomes. Previous literature has documented life-cycle effects (Levin and Stephan, 1991). 
We control for these effects by including the academic age, (PHD_AGE) of the academic, calculated 
as the difference between the current year and the year of the PhD. We further include a dummy for 
those academics that do not hold a PhD (NO_PHD), which represents 7% of the sample. We also 
account for seniority by including a dummy for being a professor. We also control for gender 
(FEMALE) as previous literature has found a gender bias in both funding and academic productivity 
(Stephan, 2012). However, women account only for 7% of academics in our sample. Funding and 
research outcomes likely differ by scientific field. We control for subject specialisation based on the 
subject of the PhD. In our sample 22% of academics graduated in electrical and electronic engineering 
(ELECTRICAL), 21% in civil engineering (CIVIL), 15% hold a PhD in chemical engineering 
(CHEMICAL), 15% in physics (PHYSICS) and 13% in mechanical engineering (MECHANICAL). Just 
8% have a background in life sciences (BIO).  
Several other factors are of importance when estimating the relationship between funding and 
productivity, foremost an academic’s teaching and administration load. We cannot measure these at 
the individual level but information is available at the department level from HESA. These measures 
include the Student-Staff-Ratio (SSR), the total staff-to-support-staff-ratio (TSR) and the ratio of 
research only staff over academic staff (RSR). In addition, the university’s overall share of income 
from research grants is used to proxy institutional differences in the access to funding. 
4.3 Analysis of funding profiles 
To get a better picture of the different funding profiles of academics in the data, Table 2 reports 
descriptive statistics for individual level variables by type of funded academic. Academics are allowed 
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to move between groups depending on their funding status in t-1. We differ between observations 
where an academic receives (1) no public or industry funding, (2) only industry funding, (3) only 
public funding and (4) both, industry and public funding. The basic descriptive results show that all 
four groups are significantly different on most of the variables. They also show that academics who 
received funding produce more publications than those who do not. However, this difference is 
significant only for academics with some public funding. Further, academics receiving both industry 
and public grants are most productive in terms of publications, citations and basic publications. This 
group of highly sponsored and diversified academics is also the group with the highest number of 
conference proceedings, the highest average impact factor and the highest propensity to patent. This is 
in line with the literature on star scientists (Zucker and Darby, 1996; Zucker et al., 2002) that suggests 
strong complementarities between high scientific ability, commercialisation and funding success. The 
patentability of research, however, does not differ by funding profile while the share of industry co-
authored publications is higher for those with industry funding.  
In terms of funding amounts, it becomes clear that academics that source funding from more than one 
source raise significantly more funding than academics that rely on just one source. This suggests that 
some academics may be more successful than others in applying for grants because of their research 
agendas or individual talent. It could further reflect that, because public grants are primarily 
distributed based on peer review and can be expected to benefit the most able academics, industry may 
look at public grants to inform their own funding decision and to identify potential partners for 
research (Perkmann et al., 2013).  
     [Table 2 about here] 
5 Method and Results 
5.1 Regression analysis for research outcomes 
As a first estimation strategy we use count data models to estimate research outcomes, as the number 
of research outcomes (publications and citations) are by nature positive and the data is characterised 
by a large number of zeros. We assume the outcome variables to have a Poisson distribution. A key 
assumption of the Poisson model is the equality of the conditional mean and the conditional variance, 
which is typically violated in applications leading to overdispersion, as is the case with publication and 
citation counts. However, although the negative binomial model may offer a solution that allows for 
overdispersion, it is only consistent and efficient if the functional form and distributional assumption 
of the variance term are correctly specified. The Poisson model, on the other hand, is consistent under 
the assumption that the mean is correctly specified even if overdispersion is present when robust 
standard errors are imposed (see Wooldridge, 2002, p 646-653). It is also robust in the presence of 
large numbers of zeros, dependence over time as well as cross-sectional dependence (Bertanha and 
Moser, 2014).  
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As we can expect decreasing marginal returns to funding even if it comes from the same funding 
source, we also include the quadratic term thus employing a specification of the form:  
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In the case of continuous variables in non-linear models the interaction effect is the cross-derivative of 
the expected marginal change in publications or citations. For example, the marginal effect of funding 
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Any two types of funding are classified as complements if the sign of the cross derivative is positive, 
i.e. if an increase in industry funding increases the marginal utility of public funding. If instead, an 
increase in industry funding decreases the productivity gains of public funding they are considered as 
substitutes on the outcome variable Pit. If the cross-derivative is zero then we would observe a purely 
additive relationship between the two types of funding where one could replace the other without 
compromising its marginal utility.  
In addition to publication based productivity measures, we also estimate the effect of different types of 
funding on the patentability of the research content. We estimate OLS regression models with 
clustered, robust standard errors and log the dependent variable to estimate the elasticity of 
patentability to increases in research funding. All funding measures are logged after adding 1 to 
correct for their skewed nature in both Poisson and OLS models. 
Theory suggests that research activity is subject to dynamic feedback (Dasgupta and David, 1994) as 
each academic’s performance is driven by cumulative unobserved factors (uit), e.g. learning, which are 
not controlled for through fixed effects. Blundell et al. (1995) therefore argue that it is important to 
                                                          
12
 Subscripts omitted.  
14 
 
consider continuous, sample-period dynamics when modelling research outcomes. To proxy for uit we 
thus include the stock of the dependent variable into all models.  
We therefore estimate pooled models, which have the advantage that they allow the inclusion of 
dynamic effects. However, they do not control for unobserved individual heterogeneity (0). In our 
case such unobserved effects could be specific skills of each academic that are positively correlated 
with the right hand side variables such as external funding and a potential endogeneity problem arises. 
For example, the literature suggests that more able academics have many more opportunities to receive 
funding as grant awarding bodies screen academics for their ability and sponsor the most productive. 
If unobserved individual heterogeneity were present, the estimated coefficient of the funding variables 
would be upwards biased. We can cope with this challenge if pre-sample information of the dependent 
variable is available. Specifically, Blundell et al. (1995, 2002) suggest a solution which controls for 
individual heterogeneity by specifying the average productivity of the academic before she enters the 
sample. The pre-sample mean of the dependent variable is a consistent estimator of the unobserved 
individual effect (vi) if it mainly corresponds to the intrinsic ability of an academic and her motivation, 
both factors that are not directly observable but may affect scientific productivity. Following Blundell 
et al. (1995, 2002) we can therefore account for unobserved individual heterogeneity by using pre-
sample information of publications and citations. We include the log of the average number of 
publications (or their citations) published in a pre-sample period (in the period 1998 to 2000). In cases 
where the pre-sample value is zero, we include a dummy to capture the “quasi-missing” value.  
The stock of the dependent variable for the years following 2000 and the pre-sample value of the 
dependent variable for the period 1998 to 2000 are thus included in all Poisson estimations. This dual 
approach helps to address the problem of endogeneity that arises from correlated individual effects and 
through dynamic feedback from the dependent variable.13 Year and university dummies are included 
in all regressions to control for potential time or institution fixed effects. In the OLS estimation for 
patentability we are not able to effectively control for pre-sample heterogeneity due to a lack of 
available data for the pre-sample period. The lagged dependent variable thus alone accounts for 
dynamic feedback. The dose response analysis reported in section 5.2 serves as a more robust analysis 
by accounting for selection into funding levels more directly.  
Tables 3 and 4 report the coefficients of our models. We firstly report the results for the control 
variables, which are consistent across the two funding specifications (i.e. models that include overall 
funding receipt and those that consider public and industry funding). Professors publish significantly 
                                                          
13
 Regressions do not suffer from multicollinearity when stock and pre-sample measures are included. 
The collinearity diagnostics show a vif (variance inflation factor) < 2 for all stock and pre-sample 
measures. 
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more and of higher quality than junior academics, perhaps due to their experience and better access to 
resources. They do not publish more articles in basic science journals, however, and they publish 
research that is less commercially oriented. We do not find a significant difference between the 
research outcomes of men and women. Academics that do not hold a PhD also produce significantly 
fewer publications, receive fewer citations and are less likely to publish research that is of commercial 
value than others. Productivity and publication quality declines with age, while research content is not 
affected. Publication and average citation numbers are lower in more applied fields of engineering 
such as civil and mechanical engineering. The patentability of research does not differ by subject area. 
However, academics with a background in either physics or life sciences report the highest numbers of 
basic science publications. University fixed effects and year effects are jointly significant. Moreover, 
our measure for teaching load has a significantly negative impact on publication numbers. Our 
measure for managerialism in terms of the share of administrative staff at the department level is 
associated with lower publication numbers, while higher numbers of research support staff are 
positively associated with patentability. The pre-sample mean and the dynamic feedback variables are 
both positive and significant in the research output estimations pointing at the importance of 
controlling for individual unobserved effects.  
     [Tables 3 and 4 about here] 
For the interpretation of the funding effects we need to consider marginal effects for the main effects 
and their second order terms and cross-derivatives for the interaction effects (following eq. (4) and (5)). 
Following Greene (2010), we present these effects graphically. Figures 1a-1d report the effect of 
overall funding for different funding values in the top left corner, the effect of public funding in the 
bottom left corner and the effect of industry funding in the top-right. We plot the joint effect of public 
and industry income as the impact of industry funding on the average marginal effect of mean public 
funding (bottom right corner of Figures 1a-1d). This representation allows us to see whether an 
increase in industry funding increases or decreases the effect of public funding and thus provides 
evidence for complementarity or substitution.  
     [Figures 1a-1d about here] 
The results show that external funding has an overall positive effect with decreasing returns on 
research outcomes (albeit insignificant for citations), supporting our positive research output function 
assumption. For illustration, doubling the funding from the sample mean increases the publication 
numbers by 0.18 publications which corresponds to 18% of the sample median of 1 publication per 
year. Differentiating between public and industry funding we find that while the number of 
publications increases (with decreasing returns) with the amount of public and the amount of industry 
funding (Figure 1a), research quality, measured in terms of basic science publications and citations 
(Figures 1b and 1c), increases only with public funding but not with industry funding. Patentability 
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increases with public and industry funding, thought the increase associated with industry is very small 
(Figure 1d).  
The cross-derivative of the interaction term is negative and significant for publication counts, 
revealing a negative effect of industry funding on the effect of public funding (Figure 1a, bottom right). 
This indicates that while public funding correlates positively with publication numbers, the joint effect 
of industry and public funding is negative, offsetting part of the positive productivity effect of public 
grants. For basic publications we find a weak negative effect that albeit significant makes little 
changes to the overall number of publications published from public grants (Figure 1c). This could be 
due to the low number reported here and to the generally rather applied nature of engineering. For 
citations (Figure 1b), we find the squared interaction term to be positive and significant for higher 
amounts of industry funding. This points to a quality-enhancing effect at higher values of joint funding, 
though again the effects are very small. For patentability, instead, we find a positive interaction effect 
(Figure 1d). Thus, while we only observe a small individual effect of industry funding, 
complementarities for commercially oriented research are realised when both public and industry 
funding are received simultaneously.  
5.2 Dose response analysis 
The parametric estimations reported above may suffer from identification problems that arise from the 
fact that research funding is not randomly distributed amongst academics. Successful grant recipients 
are likely to differ from non-recipients in important characteristics. Ignoring these differences in the 
likelihood of receiving grants in the first place, may bias the estimates of the effect research grant 
income has on research outcome variables. Econometric evaluation techniques address such potential 
selection bias (see Heckman et al., 1999; Frölich, 2004; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009, for surveys). 
The aim of the following analysis is to estimate the treatment effects of research grants on scientific 
outcomes taking these concerns into account. Given the characteristics of the academics in our sample 
and the cumulative nature of research grants, we choose a method that can deal with repeated and 
multiple grant receipts as well as with the continuous nature of the treatment variables. In particular, 
we employ a Generalized Propensity Score (GPS) method for continuous treatments which is an 
extension of the popular propensity score methodology for binary treatments (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983, 1984) and multi-valued treatments (Imbens, 2000; Lechner, 2001). Based on the GPS we can 
estimate a dose-response for research outcome as a function of the amount of funding received. The 
GPS has a balancing property similar to the binary propensity score ensuring that, conditional on 
observable characteristics, the level of the treatment can be considered as random for units belonging 
to the same GPS strata (Hirano and Imbens, 2004). This approach has the advantage over other 
parametric models that it avoids assumptions about functional forms and error term distributions. 
Based on the probability of receiving a certain treatment level conditional on a set of observable 
characteristics X, the GPS is an index function summarizing a wider set of observable characteristics 
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affecting the probability of receiving the treatment level and thus has the advantage to avoid the “curse 
of dimensionality” associated with exact matching techniques (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).14  
We follow the method proposed by Guardabascio and Ventura (2013) who build on earlier work by 
Bia and Mattei (2008) for estimating the dose-response function for cases in which the treatment 
variables are non-continuous and not normally distributed like in our case of funding amounts. In 
essence, this method estimates the dose-response function (DRF) through a generalized linear model 
which is more flexible in terms of underlying data structure. The estimation of the DRF thus follows 
from a two-step procedure in which we first estimate the parameters θ and ϕ of the conditional 
distribution of the treatment given the covariates that explain the selection into the treatment: 
1234 = 	5(6, ) = 7(6, 89) :;<
=>(<=)
?= @       (6) 
where Ti indicates the treatment level and X a set of individual, departmental and institutional 
characteristics, which are likely to predict research grant success.  
In the second step, the conditional expectation for the outcome variable, given Ti and GPSi is modelled 
such that:  
 [(B|6, 12)] = D(6, 12; F)]   (7) 
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In order to obtain an estimate of the entire dose-response function, we estimate the average potential 
outcome for selected intervals of the treatment. To assure enough observations per treatment interval, 
we divide the sample according to the distribution of the respective funding amounts (see Table A4 in 
Appendix A). Within each interval cut, we compute the GPS from Eq. (6) at the median of each cut of 
the treatment. Each cut is then further divided into blocks and within each block we calculate the mean 
differences of all covariates between individual belonging to the block and those belonging to other 
cuts. All these mean differences are then combined based on block-size weights. 
We model the selection stage close to Rentocchini et al. (2014). Important variables are previous grant 
receipt (before t-1) by type of funding and the individual’s prior research performance in terms of 
publications and patents, which are included to account for cumulative advantage in the application 
and selection process. The individual’s professorial rank, gender and career age are included to 
                                                          
14
 Matching estimators have been applied and discussed in a variety of contexts and by many scholars, 
amongst which Angrist (1998), Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Heckman et al. (1997, 1998a, 1998b), 
Lechner (1999, 2000) and Smith and Todd (2005). 
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account for experience and the research sub-field to account for differences in opportunities and 
resource demand. We further include a number of departmental factors such as the student-staff-ratio 
(SSR), the total staff-to-support-staff-ratio (TSR), and the research staff over academic staff ratio (RSR). 
To control for institutional characteristics we include the university level share of income from 
research grants in total funding, information that is available from HESA. Year dummies are included 
to capture time trends. Appendix Table A3 shows the estimation results for the GPS. Most of the 
explanatory variables are significant and show the expected signs. In particular, past grant receipts, 
rank and academic age explain future grant receipts. Moreover, prior research performance has the 
expected positive sign capturing the effects of past research performance on grant success.  
Appendix Table A4 shows mean differences between the variables after the matching procedure. For 
most of the predictors we do not observe any significant differences between the treated individuals 
and the control group. There are, however, some differences left due to the relatively small number of 
grant recipients which limits the number of potential controls taken from all other treatment levels. 
However, the most critical predictors such as past grant receipts and past research performance are 
balanced for all intervals.  
Figure 2a shows the respective dose response function for all funding, public funding and industry 
funding respectively. All research outcomes are increasing in the level of funding with the exception 
of patentability. Differentiating between public and industry sources of funding, however, provides a 
more nuanced view. First, the dose response function confirm the results from the Poisson models that 
publication numbers and citations are increasing with funding amounts for both public and industry 
grants, while basic publications only increase with funding from public funding sources. Figure 2b 
shows the estimated responses for the joint receipt of public and industry funding. More precisely, we 
estimate the dose response of public funding at different levels of industry funding. We then plot the 
estimated treatment effect associated with average public funding at different percentiles of the 
industry funding distribution, given that both types of funding had been received jointly. Confirming 
the main insights from the parametric estimations, we find that the impact of public funding on 
publication counts, the average number of citations and basic research publications is lower for higher 
levels of industry funding. For the patentability score15, on the other hand, we see a different pattern 
suggesting positive joint effects although the confidence bands are wide and the estimate is only 
statistically significant at the 75 percentile.     
 [Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
                                                          
15
 Note that we drop four observations because they were considered as outliers in the patentability 
score compared to the other values in the treatment interval in order to exclude their strong impact on 
the results.  
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Taking the selection into external funding levels into account still provides results which are 
comparable to the Poisson estimations. While the estimation is able to balance key characteristics that 
may affect selection into funding, differences in unobserved characteristics may remain. Results using 
robustness measures are reported in Appendix C.  
7 Conclusions 
This paper empirically investigated the existence of complementarities between public/non-profit and 
private-sector grant-based research funding on scientific performance. The question of 
complementarity or substitution between different types of funding is gaining in importance due to 
academics’ increased reliance on research grant income and the co-occurrence of funding from 
different sponsors with goals that may not always be aligned. In the UK, for example, university 
income from funding councils has declined in real terms over recent years and the share of research 
income sourced from external funders is continuously increasing as a consequence. Further, in the UK, 
research councils require the open dissemination of all results and data following project conclusion 
(RCUK, 2015), which may be in conflict with goals expressed by other funders, in particular industry 
sponsors. 
Results from dynamic feedback models and dose response estimations, that take into account the 
selection on observable individual level characteristics in the grant awarding process, showed that 
public and private research grants are positively associated with publication numbers and research 
quality. The results further showed that only public funding is associated with more basic science 
publications, while industry grants have no significant effect. In terms of the joint effect of public and 
private funding, the results suggest that obtaining research funding from both source types 
simultaneously reduces publication numbers and quality compared to receiving public funding alone.  
This negative joint effect for publication counts and their quality could be explained by the quicker 
turn-around required by industry sponsors that does not allow the pursuit of a higher number of 
research publications or the development of high impact research. In addition, other time-trade-offs 
associated with holding multiple grants may affect publication quantity and quality regardless of the 
type of sponsor. The administrative efforts required to manage multiple grants could also leave less 
time to develop research publications. Finally, double disclosures due to double funding of research 
may lead to lower impact publications. These results thus indicate that academics may find it difficult 
to recognise and realise potential complementarities between their publicly funded work and industry-
sponsored projects in terms of publication based outcomes. 
Conversely, for commercially oriented research, as measured by the patentability of research content, 
we find that public and industry grants are complements. This complementarity, however, does not 
carry across to other types of commercial outputs such as patents or industry co-authored publications. 
These insights suggest that while joint funding leads to more applied research, academics may still 
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lack the skills or mind-set required for successful patenting and/or joint-publications resulting from 
research that involves various sponsors. Still, patents and joint industry publications do not suffer from 
substitution effects between projects funded by public and industry sponsors, and results suggest an 
additive effect of public and industry funding.   
The results of this paper help to inform the debate on how industry and public funding jointly affect 
research productivity. Previous research has shown that academics engaged with industry or in 
commercialisation are less likely to share their results and materials (Shibayama et al., 2012; 
Czarnitzki et al. 2015b). Blumenthal et al. (2006) and Czarnitzki et al. (2015a) show evidence of 
secrecy clauses for academics with industry grants that may also affect the output of publications from 
public grants. Our study adds to this previous work pointing to disclosure and dissemination conflicts 
in the case of UK engineering academics. 
In terms of policy implications, we can conclude that co-sponsorship affects different research outputs 
differently. It remains important to provide public grants to fund research that is distributed openly 
through publications and proceedings. Private sector grants nevertheless remain very valuable to those 
academics capable of combining publicly financed research with industry projects to enable more 
applied research trajectories. However, further studies would be required to determine whether these 
findings hold for other more basic scientific fields.  
This study is a first step in exposing the interactions between different types of external funding and 
different research outcomes. We concentrated on the field of engineering, which is traditionally 
associated with applied research and industry relations. We therefore strongly encourage further 
research to consider other disciplines as funding environments continue to shift. The evidence 
presented here shows that this shift may not be without consequences for the development of the 
science base, even in applied sciences like engineering. Ours can only be a first attempt and more 
research is clearly needed to pin down the mechanisms behind the productivity effects of grant-based 
research funding. In addition, in absence of experimental settings for the context of this study, our 
research design is based on matching techniques that can only account for selection on observables. 
Unobserved factors explaining both funding received as well as research outcomes may, however, 
matter for the presented results. We therefore encourage further research based on other identification 
strategies to pin down causal effects.    
With the comparability of our results in mind, we suggest further research on the dynamics underlying 
the sponsor-research outcome relationship in both qualitative and quantitative approaches. In 
particular, the debate on research funding would benefit from an investigation into whether and how 
funding relationships affect both short-term scientific outcomes and the shaping of scientific careers. It 
may be that academics specialise in certain types of grants and sponsors, and hence the type of 
research output they pursue. The issue of double funding also warrants further investigation, i.e. 
whether similar effects are found for concurrent grants from sponsors that are similar in nature. 
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While consulting and informal contacts with industry tend to be highly correlated with contract 
research for industry (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Ponomariov and Boardman, 2008), future 
research may also address the difference between pure consulting activities, which is are less research 
oriented and requires high levels of contact, and contract research, which is more research oriented. If 
the former type of activity outweighs the second type, the overall effect on publications would be 
negative, but may be driven by consulting and not industry grants in general.  
Finally, it is important to stress that this study does not evaluate other benefits that may come from co-
sponsorship. A more comprehensive assessment is therefore needed to establish any benefits for 
students or teaching as well as benefits for the sponsoring firms, which would contribute to the social 
returns from science and may therefore be of greater policy relevance than publications and patents.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Supplement figures and tables 
 [Table A1 to A4; Figures A1 to A2b here] 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Patentability Measure 
Following Azoulay et al. (2009), we construct a measure of patentability using title words on 
publications to “identify the areas in which [academics] have conducted research and then apply 
weights to these areas based on an (endogenous-to-the-sample) measure of the extent to which other 
scientists working in these areas have patented their discoveries” (p: 654).  
We use double disclosures, i.e. research that resulted in both patents and publication, as a benchmark 
for patentable research. Previous research has argued that scientific and technological disclosure co-
evolve and stress the importance of such ‘dual knowledge’ (Ducor, 2000; Murray, 2002; Murray and 
Stern, 2007). The use of such a benchmark for patentable research is an improvement on Azoulay et al. 
(2009) who used all publications of patenting academics as benchmark, regardless of whether these 
publications were linked to patents. We build up the benchmark sample of publications based on all 
EPO patents (including applications) by engineering academics at 40 UK universities with priority 
dates between 1997 and 2005 (in total 917 patents; see Banal-Estanol et al. 2015 for a description of 
the data). The benchmark is thus not entirely endogenous-to-the-sample as we consider patents from a 
larger pool of engineering academics. This data was shared with the APE-INV programme 
(http://www.academicpatenting.eu) which matched these patents to Web of Science listed journal 
articles published between 1999 and 2007 (the shortened time window was due to data access 
restrictions), that have at least one common author and, following a text analysis of titles and abstract, 
deal with the same research result (see Lissoni et al. 2013 for a detailed description of the 
methodology). After matching, only the best-matched patent-publication pairs (PPPs) with similarity 
index values in the top 25% of the first percentile were retained, corresponding to 730 pairs, or 238 
patents and 652 publications.  
The 652 PPP publications (which include 116 publications by our focal academics) are considered as 
benchmark for patentable research, to which we compare the research of each academic in order to 
generate a patentability score. In building this measure we closely follow Azoulay et al. (2009) in that 
we produce a list of keywords j used by academic i in t, and count the number of times (nj) that j 
appears on publications. We then calculate the proportion of the total number of keywords (nk) it 
represents and finally apply a patentability weight w before taking the sum over all keywords: 
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The weight w is based on the number of times the keyword j appeared in PPP publications up to t 
(excluding the focal academic i’s publications) as proportion of all keywords used on PPP publications 
and dividing this by the number of times the keyword appeared on publications that are not part of a 
PPP (again excluding the focal academic i’s publications).  
OP =	
∑ IP∑ IXX+++:Q{}
∑ IPQ+++:Q{}  
To create the matrix of keywords we make use of txttool in Stata (Williams and Williams, 2014) and 
first eliminate uninformative ‘stop words’ (including pronouns, frequent words and numbers) from the 
titles, and replace some words that are synonyms, plurals and other variants with a single term. This 
process was aided by the Text Analyzer at Online-Utility.org (https://www.online-
utility.org/text/analyzer.jsp) which was used to identify frequent words. The final matrix includes 
more than 8000 keywords, more than 3000 of which only appear once.  
The weights w are larger for keywords that have appeared with a higher than average frequency on 
PPPs. Table B1 reports some examples of words that appear more frequently on PPPs. The first two 
examples refer to fibre Bragg gratings, a technology that appears disproportionally on PPPs compared 
to publications that are not linked to a patent. The keywords with the highest weights are stellate cells 
and clathrate hydrates, referring to research in biochemistry and chemical engineering respectively. 
Low weights are assigned to words that appear frequently on non-PPPs but are uncommon on PPPs. 
These include atom and semiconductor, as well as various chemical elements, such as aluminium.  
After assigning each keyword the appropriate weight and taking the sum over all keywords on 
academic i's publications, we get to the composite patentability measure, which, in our case, takes 
values between 0 and 6. This measure “increases in the degree to which keywords in the titles of a 
focal academic’s publications have appeared relatively more frequently in the titles of [PPPs by] other 
academics” (Azoulay et al. 2009: 672). This score thus represents the patentability of the academic’s 
research. After multiplying by 100, the score that is included as outcome variable in the model ranges 
from 0 to 600 with a mean of 9 among all academics and a mean of 16.7 amongst those with a score 
larger than zero.  
Appendix C: Alternative outcome measures 
As a robustness check we estimate our models for four alternative outcome measures as described in 
section 4.2: PROCEEDINGS, AV.IMPACT, INDPUB and PATENT. The descriptive statistics for the 
four measures are reported in Tables 1 and 2 and correlations in Appendix Table A2. They show that 
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the mean number of proceedings per academic per year is 1.06, and thus lower than the number of 
publications. The average impact factor is 0.75 and highly correlated with citation numbers (ρ = 
0.5883). Both, PROCEEDINGS and AV.IMPACT  factor are highest for academics that receive 
industry and public grants. The mean share of industry co-authored publications is 9%, and 14% for 
years with at least one publication. The share is higher for academics with some industry funding at 
14-15% of publications. The mean share of academic-year observations with at least one patent is 6% 
and significantly higher for academics with both types of funding. 
The results of the parametric estimations (Figure C1a and C1b) show that PROCEEDINGS increase 
with funding but that there is a negative joint effect of public and industry funding, thus confirming 
the results of the publication equation. AV.IMPACT increases only with public but not industry 
funding, in line with results for citations and basic publications. The joint effect is negative suggesting 
that those who receive funding from public and private sponsors publish in lower impact journals than 
those that receive funding only from public sources. In this regard AV.IMPACT differs from citation 
counts where the interaction effect was positive for higher values of industry funding. The estimated 
dose response function for the robustness variables PROCEEDINGS and AV.IMPACT are similar to 
those for publication numbers and citation counts discussed in the main text. Figure C2a illustrates 
these effects graphically. Figure C2b depicts the estimated marginal impact of public funding at 
different percentiles of industry funding and confirms declining marginal effects of public funding for 
higher levels of industry funding for PROCEEDINGS, but not for AV.IMPACT. 
Using INDPUB and PATENT we find, unlike for patentability, a positive and independent 
(insignificant joint) effect of both types of funding for most of the industry funding distribution. In the 
dose response function estimation, PATENT probability increases with both funding types, but 
especially with industry funding, while INDPUB does not increase with higher funding levels of any 
type. The joint effect is insignificant. Thus, the complementarity found for PATENTABILITY is not 
confirmed, but neither do we find strong evidence for a substitution effect suggesting additivity of 
different types of funding in the production of commercially oriented research. While 
PATENTABILITY measures commercially oriented research in general, industry co-authorship and 
patenting require collaboration on research outcomes and/or efforts going beyond research. Not all 
academics that produce commercially oriented, patentable research may have such skills, which may 
explain the differences observed here. 
[Figures C1, C2a and C2b about here] 
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Figures 
Figure 1a: Predicted Margins and Marginal Effects of Funding on Publication numbers 
 
Figure 1b: Predicted Margins and Marginal Effects of Funding on Mean Citations 
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Figure 1c: Predicted Margins and Marginal Effects of Funding on Basic Publications 
 
 
Figure 1d: Predicted Margins and Marginal Effects of Funding on Patentability 
 
Note [Figures 1a-1d]: Vertical dashed line indicates the sample mean; vertical dotted line the 75th 
percentile. The 75th percentile for industry funding is zero. 90% confidence intervals are reported. 
Slopes for the joint effect are significant where confidence intervals do not cross the horizontal red 
line.  
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Figure 2a: Dose Response Functions by funding type on Publication numbers, av. citations, basic publications and patentability 
 
Note: Dose response functions with 95% confidence bands are reported.  
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Figure 2b: Change in the Dose Response Function at the mean of public funding at selected values of the industry funding distribution 
 
Note: 90% confidence intervals are reported. Slopes for the joint effect are significant where confidence intervals do not cross the horizontal red line. 
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Figure C1a: Marginal Effects of Funding on Proceedings, Average Journal Impact, Share of Industry Publications and Patenting Propensity 
 
Note: Vertical dashed lines indicate the sample mean; vertical dotted lines the 75th percentile. The 75th percentile for industry funding is zero. 90% confidence 
intervals are reported. Effect on PROCEEDINGS and AV.IMPACT are estimated using Poisson estimations, INDPUB using fractional logits and PATENT 
propensity using logit models. 
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Figure C1b: Joint effect of public and industry funding on Proceedings, Average Journal Impact, Share of Industry Publications and Patenting 
Propensity 
 
Note: Vertical dashed lines indicate the sample mean; 90% confidence intervals are reported. Slopes for the joint effect are significant where confidence intervals 
do not cross the horizontal red line. Effect on PROCEEDINGS and AV.IMPACT are estimated using Poisson estimations, INDPUB using fractional logits and 
PATENT propensity using logit models. 
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Figure C2a: Dose Response Functions by funding type for Proceedings, Average Journal Impact, Share of Industry Publications and Patenting 
Propensity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Dose response functions with 95% confidence bands are reported.  
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Figure C2b: Change in the Dose Response Function at the mean of public funding at selected values of the industry funding distribution for alternative 
outcome measures 
 
Note: 90% confidence intervals are reported. Slopes for the joint effect are significant where confidence intervals do not cross the horizontal red line.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (4,789 observations) 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Output measures 
PUBLICATIONSit (Publication number) 2.26 3.20 0 32 
AV.CITATIONSit (Mean 5 yr citation number) 2.88 5.41 0 143 
BASICit (Publication number in Basic journals) 0.64 1.86 0 24 
PATENTABILITYit (Patentability of published research) 8.95 32.07 0 600 
Funding measures(in 100,000 GBP) 
FUNDINGit-1 0.32 0.95 0 12.12 
PUBLIC_FUNDINGit-1 0.26 0.84 0 11.67 
INDUSTRY_FUNDINGit-1 0.06 0.27 0 7.22 
Individual characteristics 
PROFESSORit-1 0.34 0.47 0 1 
FEMALEi 0.07 0.25 0 1 
NO_PHDi 0.07 0.25 0 1 
PHD_AGEi 18.61 10.47 0 49 
BIOi 0.07 0.26 0 1 
PHYSICSi 0.15 0.36 0 1 
MECHANICALi  0.13 0.34 0 1 
ELECTRICALi 0.22 0.41 0 1 
CHEMICALi  0.15 0.36 0 1 
CIVILi 0.21 0.41 0 1 
University  characteristics 
SSRit (Student-Staff-Ratio) 14.13 4.17 6.90 26.40 
TSRit (Total Staff-Support Staff-Ratio) 2.06 0.61 1.05 4.92 
RSRit (Researchers-Academic Staff-Ratio) 0.64 0.38 0 1.91 
CONTRACTS SHAREit (over total income) 19.95 5.90 4.85 29.43 
Robustness output measures     
PROCEEDINGSit (Proceedings number) 1.06 2.41 0 41 
AV.IMPACT (Mean journal impact factor) 0.75 0.96 0 11.66 
INDPUBit (Share of industry-co-authored publications) 0.09 0.23 0 1 
PATENTit (Patent dummy) 0.06 0.24 0 1 
     
 
 
Table 2: Means by funding structure 
1 2 3 4 5 
Funding 
Public=0; 
Industry=0 
Public=0; 
Industry>0 
Public>0; 
Industry=0 
Public>0;  
Industry>0 
Anova 
F-Test 
# observations 2845 303 1104 537 Sig. 
# academics 650 140 364 194   
Output measures       
PUBLICATIONSit 1.75 1.98 2.73*** 4.12*** *** 
AV.CITATIONSit 2.48 2.46 3.37*** 4.25*** *** 
BASICit  0.49 0.25** 0.79*** 1.40*** *** 
PATENTABILITYit 8.85 8.56 10.02 7.45  
Funding measures (in 100,000 GBP) 
FUNDINGit-1 0.00 0.22*** 0.62*** 1.42*** *** 
PUBLIC_FUNDINGit-1 0.00 0.00 0.62*** 1.05*** *** 
INDUSTRY_FUNDINGit-1 0.00 0.22*** 0.00 0.38*** *** 
Alternative output measures 
PROCEEDINGSit  0.72 1.10*** 1.42*** 2.09*** *** 
AV.IMPACTit 0.64 0.66 0.93*** 1.06*** *** 
INDPUBit 0.07 0.14*** 0.10*** 0.15*** *** 
PATENTit 0.04 0.06 0.07*** 0.13*** *** 
Note: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% 10%. Stars in columns 2-4 indicate significance of mean comparison with 
column 1 (observations with no funding). Analysis of variance (column 5) compares the four groups of academics.  
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Table 3: Overall funding equations 
1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES PUBLICATIONSit AV.CITATIONSit BASICit ln[PATENTABILITY]it 
POISSON POISSON POISSON OLS 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
ln[FUNDING]it-1 0.526*** 0.098 0.174 0.129 0.903*** 0.210 0.341*** 0.114 
ln[FUNDING2]it-1 -0.218*** 0.060 -0.079 0.062 -0.362*** 0.104 -0.161*** 0.058 
PROFESSORit-1 0.334*** 0.058 0.318*** 0.062 0.007 0.145 0.210*** 0.047 
FEMALEi 0.050 0.080 -0.109 0.099 0.293 0.191 -0.047 0.078 
NO_PHDi -0.743*** 0.149 -0.639*** 0.201 0.519 0.418 -0.530*** 0.087 
PHD_AGEit -0.016*** 0.003 -0.014*** 0.004 -0.009 0.007 -0.008*** 0.002 
BIOi 0.188** 0.090 0.536*** 0.099 1.685*** 0.221 0.117 0.085 
PHYSICSi 0.287*** 0.077 0.306*** 0.100 1.777*** 0.229 0.047 0.066 
MECHANICALi 0.035 0.082 -0.037 0.105 0.552** 0.233 -0.017 0.068 
ELECTRICALi 0.172** 0.072 0.225** 0.097 1.100*** 0.225 0.102 0.062 
CHEMICALi 0.378*** 0.075 0.417*** 0.096 1.570*** 0.216 0.095 0.063 
CIVILi (Reference)               
SSRit -0.021*** 0.008 -0.009 0.009 -0.045*** 0.016 -0.002 0.006 
TSRit 0.101** 0.051 0.042 0.099 -0.225 0.155 0.081 0.057 
RSRit 0.069 0.075 -0.039 0.092 0.202 0.166 0.138* 0.072 
ln[Pub_Mean|Cit_Mean] 0.366*** 0.046 0.200*** 0.038 0.671*** 0.093 
[Pub_Mean|Cit_Mean=0] -0.684*** 0.098 -0.450*** 0.089 -0.829*** 0.227 
L.Dependent Variable Stock 0.015*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.002 0.023*** 0.005 0.001* 0.000 
Joint sign. of university dummies χ2 (14) 79.75***   94.95***   66.33***   4.93***   
Joint sign. of subject dummies χ2 (5) 35.35*** 
  
48.69*** 
  
89.01*** 
  
1.21 
  
Joint sign. of year dummies χ2 (5) 21.01***   7.38   13.54**   4.31***   
Log-likelihood -8629.400 
 
-14978.507 -4041.975 
 
-7885.202 
 
F  
  
 
 
10.14*** 
 
#  academics 807 
  
807 
  
807 
  
807 
  
#  observations 4789   4789   4789   4789   
Note: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% 10%. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; clustered by individual academic. Models include a constant. 
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Table 4: Split funding equations 
1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES PUBLICATIONSit AV.CITATIONSit BASICit Ln[PATENTABILITY]it 
POISSON POISSON POISSON OLS 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
ln[PUBLIC_FUNDING]it-1 0.575*** 0.108 0.197 0.147 0.974*** 0.247 0.342*** 0.122 
ln[PUBLIC_FUNDING2]it-1 -0.251*** 0.067 -0.074 0.077 -0.354*** 0.122 -0.227*** 0.064 
ln[INDUSTRY_FUNDING]it-1 1.177*** 0.373 -0.201 0.535 0.483 0.861 -0.039 0.479 
ln[INDUSTRY_FUNDING2]it-1 -1.387*** 0.509 0.052 0.785 -0.481 0.987 0.115 0.669 
ln[PUBLIC_FUNDING]it -1# ln[INDUSTRY_FUNDING]it-1 -1.969** 0.883 0.535 1.031 -0.362 1.775 0.872 1.199 
ln[PUBLIC_FUNDING2]it -1# ln[INDUSTRY_FUNDING]it-1 0.897* 0.503 -0.214 0.489 -0.175 0.839 -0.021 0.648 
ln[PUBLIC_FUNDING]it -1# ln[INDUSTRY_FUNDING2]it-1 1.918* 1.026 -0.397 1.318 -0.466 1.814 -0.352 1.284 
ln[PUBLIC_FUNDING2]it -1# ln[INDUSTRY_FUNDING2]it-1 -0.759 0.580 0.161 0.595 0.653 0.899 -0.166 0.691 
PROFESSORit-1 0.329*** 0.057 0.318*** 0.062 -0.002 0.140 0.208*** 0.046 
FEMALEi 0.063 0.081 -0.105 0.102 0.327* 0.193 -0.058 0.078 
NO_PHDi -0.725*** 0.146 -0.634*** 0.202 0.527 0.414 -0.533*** 0.088 
PHD_AGEit -0.015*** 0.003 -0.014*** 0.004 -0.008 0.007 -0.008*** 0.002 
BIOi 0.189** 0.087 0.537*** 0.099 1.673*** 0.220 0.119 0.085 
PHYSICSi 0.298*** 0.075 0.311*** 0.100 1.773*** 0.229 0.053 0.066 
MECHANICALi 0.037 0.080 -0.032 0.105 0.557** 0.234 -0.015 0.068 
ELECTRICALi 0.179** 0.070 0.231** 0.097 1.119*** 0.225 0.101 0.062 
CHEMICALi 0.379*** 0.073 0.414*** 0.095 1.563*** 0.216 0.100 0.063 
CIVILi (Reference)               
SSRit -0.021*** 0.008 -0.009 0.009 -0.044*** 0.016 -0.002 0.006 
TSRit 0.095* 0.051 0.039 0.099 -0.259* 0.153 0.082 0.057 
RSRit 0.050 0.072 -0.043 0.093 0.143 0.157 0.137* 0.073 
ln[Pub_Mean|Cit_Mean] 0.360*** 0.047 0.198*** 0.038 0.666*** 0.093 
[Pub_Mean|Cit_Mean=0] -0.680*** 0.098 -0.450*** 0.089 -0.833*** 0.227 
L.Dependent Variable Stock 0.015*** 0.003 0.011*** 0.002 0.023*** 0.006 0.001* 0.000 
Joint sign. of university dummies χ2 (14) 82.61***   97.39***   64.70 ***   4.87***   
Joint sign. of subject dummies χ2 (5) 36.64*** 
  
48.25*** 
  
87.63*** 
  
1.20 
  
Joint sign. of year dummies χ2 (5) 19.02***   7.45   11.59**   4.35***   
Log-likelihood -8612.704  -14969.750 -4022.917  -7882.386 
 
F  
  
 
 
9.70*** 
 
#  academics 807 
  
807 
  
807 
  
807 
  
#  observations 4789   4789   4789   4789   
Note: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% 10%. Robust clustered standard errors in parentheses; clustered by individual academic. Models include a constant. 
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Annex A 
 
Table A1: List of Universities 
University Name Academics Region 
Brunel University 48 London 
City University London 23 London 
Queen Mary University 31 London 
University of Reading 22 South East 
University of Cambridge 122 East 
University of Essex 26 East 
University of Leicester 29 East Midlands 
Loughborough University 123 East Midlands 
University of Durham 21 North East 
Lancaster University 10 North West 
University of Sheffield 100 Yorkshire 
University of Edinburgh 53 Scotland 
University of Glasgow 63 Scotland 
University of Strathclyde 97 Scotland 
University of Swansea 46 Wales 
Total 807*  
*Academics can change university within the sample. Therefore, numbers do not add up to 807. 
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Table A2: Correlation matrix for individual level variables (4,789 observations) 
                      
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 PUBLICATIONSit 1.000       
2 AV.CITATIONSit 0.322*** 1.000          
3 BASICit  0.729*** 0.270*** 1.000         
4 ln(PATENTABILITYit) 0.245*** 0.234*** 0.109*** 1.000        
5 PROCEEDINGSit  0.312*** 0.130*** 0.170*** 0.058*** 1.000       
6 AV.IMPACTit 0.465*** 0.588*** 0.467*** 0.332*** 0.134*** 1.000      
7 INDPUBit 0.135*** 0.122*** 0.054*** 0.119*** 0.094*** 0.157*** 1.000     
8 PATENTit 0.139*** 0.077*** 0.135*** 0.016 0.148*** 0.122*** 0.109*** 1.000    
9 ln(FUNDINGit-1) 0.271*** 0.111*** 0.184*** 0.075*** 0.263*** 0.166*** 0.074*** 0.104*** 1.000   
10 ln(PUBLIC_FUNDINGit-1) 0.253*** 0.103*** 0.174*** 0.067*** 0.245*** 0.161*** 0.052*** 0.082*** 0.959*** 1.000  
11 ln(INDUSTRY_FUNDINGit-1) 0.176*** 0.077*** 0.133*** 0.057*** 0.169*** 0.086*** 0.080*** 0.115*** 0.552*** 0.313*** 1.000 
Note: ***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% 10%. 
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Table A3: Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the generalized propensity score (Generalized Linear Models) 
Treatment variable: ALL FUNDING PUBLIC FUNDING INDUSTRY FUNDING 
  Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.   Coef. Std.Err.   
PROFESSOR 0.964 0.080 *** 0.909 0.089 *** 0.523 0.105 *** 
FEMALE -0.105 0.132 -0.157 0.161 0.296 0.176 * 
ln(PHD_AGE) -0.338 0.067 *** -0.369 0.075 *** -0.146 0.100 
BIO 0.134 0.138 0.081 0.155 0.260 0.194 
PHYSICS 0.328 0.095 *** 0.289 0.101 *** 0.704 0.163 *** 
MECHANICAL 0.302 0.101 *** 0.180 0.111 0.863 0.157 *** 
ELECTRICAL 0.183 0.097 * 0.174 0.103 * 0.320 0.113 *** 
CHEMICAL 0.066 0.107 0.160 0.118 -0.339 0.133 ** 
ln[Pat_Mean] 0.012 0.119 0.123 0.146 -0.100 0.157 
Pub_Mean =0 -0.109 0.107 0.091 0.124 -0.415 0.129 *** 
Past FUNDING 0.372 0.113 ***  
Past PUBLIC FUNDING    0.439 0.102 *** 0.182 0.094 * 
Past INDUSTRY FUNDING    0.258 0.078 *** 0.202 0.107 * 
SSR -0.016 0.008 * -0.009 0.008 -0.036 0.016 ** 
NAR 0.059 0.070 0.072 0.071 -0.089 0.110 
TRR 0.068 0.102 -0.019 0.109 0.553 0.164 *** 
CONTR.SHARE 0.023 0.007 *** 0.019 0.008 ** 0.021 0.011 * 
ln[Pub_Mean] 0.181 0.041 *** 0.100 0.043 ** 0.238 0.070 *** 
Pub_Mean=0 0.080 0.082 0.029 0.083 0.274 0.156 * 
# observations 1602 1335 700 
Log pseudolikelihood  -8558.53 -7090.85 -3059.01 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** (**, *) indicate 1% (5%, 10%) confidence levels. These results are 
based on the case for PUBLICATIONS as outcome variable. The results from the models for the other outcome variables 
differ only slightly due to different pre-sample variables of the respective outcome indicator in the models. The 
estimation results are available upon request.  
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Table A4: Balancing tests of the GPS estimator 
Variable 
Treatment Interval 1 
[1, 6] 
Treatment Interval 2 
[7, 19] 
Treatment Interval 3 
[20, 46] 
Treatment Interval 4 
[47, 99] 
Treatment Interval 5 
[100, 1846] 
  
mean 
diff.  
t-
value 
mean 
diff.  t-value 
mean 
diff.  t-value 
mean 
diff.  t-value 
mean 
diff.  t-value 
PROFESSOR -0.062 -2.832 0.013 0.787 0.030 2.256 -0.039 -1.429 -0.078 -4.834 
FEMALE 0.004 0.165 -0.010 -0.517 0.008 0.502 -0.030 -2.018 0.053 2.946 
ln(PHD_AGE) -0.178 -4.226 0.023 0.645 0.046 1.611 0.022 0.755 -0.011 -0.339 
BIO -0.028 -1.168 -0.026 -1.219 -0.005 -0.287 0.008 0.536 0.011 0.607 
PHYSICS -0.020 -0.573 0.012 0.391 -0.019 -0.805 0.007 0.316 0.006 0.268 
MECHANICAL 0.024 0.726 -0.009 -0.324 -0.005 -0.221 -0.008 -0.374 -0.053 -2.245 
ELECTRICAL -0.009 -0.235 0.033 0.996 0.014 0.559 0.002 0.088 -0.001 -0.024 
CHEMICAL -0.072 -2.556 0.036 1.434 -0.011 -0.546 0.011 0.541 0.007 0.292 
2004 -0.002 -0.059 -0.043 -1.417 0.037 1.535 -0.007 -0.301 0.000 0.002 
2005 0.051 1.459 -0.007 -0.209 -0.042 -1.710 0.004 0.170 0.023 0.842 
2006 -0.045 -1.258 0.028 0.871 0.013 0.533 -0.011 -0.468 0.034 1.256 
2007 -0.010 -0.283 0.005 0.156 -0.016 -0.665 0.036 1.547 -0.041 -1.561 
ln[Pat_Mean] 0.010 0.390 0.000 -0.016 -0.011 -0.640 -0.013 -0.892 0.027 1.930 
Pub_Mean =0 -0.054 -1.812 -0.046 -1.742 -0.015 -0.733 0.024 1.298 0.042 2.379 
Past_FUNDING 0.062 2.756 0.017 0.854 -0.017 -0.988 -0.017 -0.858 -0.067 -2.827 
SSR 0.519 1.663 -0.136 -0.493 -0.205 -0.934 0.265 1.196 -0.026 -0.103 
NAR 0.113 2.196 -0.007 -0.144 -0.070 -1.986 0.000 -0.005 0.011 0.272 
TRR 0.034 1.012 0.021 0.707 0.002 0.082 -0.027 -1.181 -0.025 -1.014 
CONTR.SHARE -0.223 -0.491 -0.496 -1.224 0.130 0.408 -0.106 -0.336 0.032 0.088 
ln[Pub_Mean] 0.018 0.268 0.162 2.770 0.061 1.343 -0.079 -1.585 -0.060 -1.304 
Pub_Mean=0 0.001 0.019 0.021 0.879 0.005 0.280 -0.003 -0.149 -0.003 -0.111 
Note: Test that the conditional mean of the pre-treatment variables given the GPS is not different between units who belong to a 
particular treatment interval and units who belong to all other treatment intervals. These results are based on all FUNDING. 
Statistics for the other funding variables are available upon request. 
 
 
5 
 
Annex B 
Table B1: Sample Title Keywords 1999 - 2006 
 Number of times on PPPs 
Z IP+++:Q{}  
Number of times used on non-
PPPs 
Z IPQ+++:Q{}  
Keyword weight: 
OP =	
∑ IP∑ IXX+++:Q{}
∑ IPQ+++:Q{}  
 
Number of papers 685 17,843  
Number of words 4,376 103,571  
Number of unique keywords 1,395 8,567  
    
Bragg 31 65 0.000109 
grate 62 83 0.000171 
stellate 10 1 0.002285 
clathrate 6 1 0.001371 
    
atom 1 107 0.000002 
aluminium 1 281 0.000001 
superconductor 4 78 0.000011 
Note: PPP = patent-paper-pairs, nPPP = non-patent-paper-pairs; nj is the number of times the focal keyword appeared; nk is the total number of keywords used on 
publications; i is the focal academic’s publications. 
 
